A “surge” for Afghanistan? Is it too late?

The initial U.S. involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003 almost entirely consisted of Special Operations Forces and ancillary, companion elements…it was considered a “Special Operations War”. Quietly, efficiently, effectively these “silent professionals” carried out the campaign to deconstruct the Taliban and their allies, and surgically dismantle Al Qaeda and its sub-elements and partner stateless organizations. While these same “silent warriors” had practically 100% availability and priority use of air, land, and sea support assets, they carried out their mission plans with near battlefield supremacy. These support conditions are what allowed for the quick toppling of the radical Taliban regime. Our forces were complimented on their rapid and efficient success.

The United Nations was basically “on board” with this particular U.S. war of intervention, authorizing a UN mandate from the world body proclaiming its justness and legitimate status. NATO and EU partners were quickly brought aboard and at least in the beginning, willfully contributed troops and resources for the conduct of the war. I can personally vouch for the unwavering bravery, lethality, and steadfastness of several NATO allies of the U.S. and was proud to serve alongside these fellow comrades-in-arms. Other allied nations have been, and still are, reticent and reluctant to show any guts in the face of the enemy, instead choosing the least “dangerous” mission sets (if possible) in a front-less, asymmetric war.

Once our mission transitioned from nearly all Special Operations forces to majority conventional regular Army components (2003 to 2004) it seemed we then relied on our partner nations and allies to fulfill our wildest hopes for deploying large land forces and allowing a “dream scenario” if you will of massed U.S., Allied, and Afghan national military units. This scenario apparently never materialized (to date Canada has been the second largest contributor of forces), quickly began waning from 2005 forward and now, with the increase of casualties, especially among allied nations, will likely continue to erode. There is much discussion about the “failed” Bush administration’s strategy in Iraq, and how Secretary Rumsfield “blew it” there, but not many discussions center on these same circumstances for Afghanistan. The same folks that brought you “failures” in Iraq were (and are) in charge of Afghanistan also! Is it possible the Bush administration, while looking for ways and means to maximize troops totals for an upcoming Iraq engagement, crossed its fingers, so to speak, on the expectations for Afghanistan support from our allies?

Nonetheless, it seems obvious we are now seeking to possibly “correct” our commitment and troop totals in Afghanistan. The listening to our “commanders in the field” we so often hear about for Iraq and how that drives mission and policy is now apparently the new norm for Afghanistan. Recent top level generals placed in charge of the theater of operations are expressing more vocally their need to have more boots on the ground and priority of air assets, both combat aircraft and intelligence platforms, and administration responses seem to indicate a major shift to meeting those requests.

I know that hindsight is always 20/20, but I often wonder about things such as: had we began the “surge” in Iraq much sooner, would we then have been able to initiate a “surge” like action for Afghanistan a fews years back? My personal viewpoint is that Afghanistan should have always been a “surge” build-up priority from 2002-2003 forward once the conventional forces took primary control for the conduct of the war and majority troop totals. I feel we didn’t fully commit to overwhelmingly “finish off” this conflict before supporting another. This is not to say our Armed Forces haven’t accomplished great and incredible deeds of mission accomplishment while conducting the war so far, simply that if given greater forces and support assets they could do so very, very much more.

What say you the blogoshere? Drop a comment or two. Enjoy!


The Dust of Empire: Imperial involvement in modern day Afghanistan – Imperial Hubris, Imperial Amnesia, Imperial Folly, or just plain stupid?

(The statement “the dust of Empire” comes from an exerpt of Charles de Gaulle)

(It is also the title of an interesting book I have just recently began reading, “The Dust of Empire: The Race for Mastery in the Asian Heartland”, by Karl E. Meyer. I felt the title would make for a great “artsy” title slug to the opening blog submission.)

Why have so many empires fought through and for control over one of the least desirable plots of land on Earth?

Perhaps at one time or two in the distant past this area, and its control, held sway over the wealthiest trade route(s) of the world. Up until the last century, merely holding the actual landmass could actually tempt some empires (Russia, then the USSR) to dream of expanding to other nearby lands of greater value and wealth access. But with the advent of modern sea transportation capabilities, and then later air transportation, involvement in this country for any trade or commerce reason(s) should have been erased. Commercial (or other ventures) access for the “West” to the riches of the “East” would seem to be handled now with a more safe, consistent, and wholly corporate method unhindered by land-based peculiarities surrounding the Hindu Kush (mountians).

So far the imperial “boneyard” affected by this particular country (Afghanistan) includes: the Persian, Mede-Persian, the Macedonian/Greek (Alexander the Great), the Mongol, the British, the French, and the Russian/Soviets. Currently, and arguably, the wealthest, strongest, and most powerful empire, the United States of America, is said to be its next “victim”. Only time will tell whether this will hold true.

Obviously, the “Pashtun” question is, and has been, a central factor in determining the outcome of all other issues regarding the disposition of life and government for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (Some might argue that long ago, imperial invovlement in this region should have allowed, encouraged, or implaced a dominate “Pashtoonistan”, then settled the other ancillary “balkanized” substrata populations into weaker nation-states). Arguably the largest “national identity” in this country and region lay within the confines of Pashtun separatism. All other sub-groupings of population have greater ethnic identity and allegience to other external populations than to any polyglot, multi-ethnic, mishmash national identity model we’re trying to forge there now.

Well, these few starting points should do well to kick off any discussion(s) for now. I will close this initial posting here and let all of you out there discover the site and start chatting. I wish to extend my thanks in advance for all fellow bloggers that may visit and comment. I invite one and all to peruse over the blog at your leisure. Please consider commenting a time or two, you are most welcome to contribute your proverbial “two cents worth”.